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support. 1 Introduction
This paper develops a simple general equilibrium model with retailers acting
as intermediaries between manufacturers and consumers. The paper has two
main purposes. The ﬁrst one is to propose a simple model capturing key
features of the retailing and of the manufacturing industry in order to under-
stand how these two industries interact and how labor is allocated between
them. The second purpose is to investigate how the equilibrium in the re-
tailing and manufacturing sector reacts to shocks such as market integration
and technological change. By doing so we shed light on the circumstances
under which retailers increase their assortment, slotting allowances rise, re-
tail market concentration increases, labor is reallocated from manufacturing
to retailing, as well as the welfare impact of these changes. In the process we
also identify a novel beneﬁt from market integration consisting of eﬃciency
gains in the vertical distribution chain.
When considering intermediation and more speciﬁcally retail trade, sev-
eral stylized facts should be taken into account. The ﬁrst one is that, over
the last 40 years, there has been a fundamental increase in the importance
of services in general and of wholesale and retail trade in particular. In the
United States, for instance, this shift took place especially strongly from the
end of the 1970s and it took place at the expense of manufacturing. Simply
put, US employment fell in manufacturing between 1970 and 1990, but rose
by 71% in wholesale and retail trade (see Blum, 2008).1 In 2008 retailing
alone was the second largest industry in the US in terms of employment (11%
of total employment, a higher share than in manufacturing; US Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 2009) and accounted for $3.9 trillion in annual sales.2
Second, retailers typically carry a large variety of products. In many re-
tail sectors, product assortment has risen over time. According to Quelch
and Kenny (1994), the number of consumer-packaged-goods stock-keeping
units (SKUs) grew 16% each year between 1985 and 1992. Grocery retailing
1In 1970, employment in wholesale and retail trade was 22% lower than in manufac-
turing, whereas it was 31% higher in 1990. This large shift in employment remains valid
when corrected for the fact that retail and wholesale trade have a greater proportion of
part-time jobs than manufacturing.
2Not including food services and drinking places (Table 1017: Retail Trade and Food
Services, 2010 Statistical Abstract, US Bureau of the Census). The US wholesale market
represented another $4.5 trillion in sales in 2008, split approximately equally between
durable and non-durable goods (Table 2012).
1is just one example in this respect, but a revealing one. In the US, this
sector is dominated by supermarkets (i.e. stores with sales in excess of $2
million annually).3 In 2008, there were 35,394 supermarkets selling on av-
erage 46,852 items. The average number of products sold by a supermarket
has also increased signiﬁcantly over the last 30 years and, with it, the size
of supermarkets which has reached an average size of 46,755 square feet in
2008, resulting in a steady increase in the ratio of square footage to sales (see
Klein and Wright, 2006, Figure 1).4
Third, slotting allowances, which are lump-sum payments made by man-
ufacturers to retailers to carry their products, are today an important feature
of retailing used in a variety of product lines such as grocery food, tobacco,
household supplies, health and beauty aid, textiles, shoes and footwear, and
automotive parts (see Sudhir and Rao, 2006; Wilkie et al., 2002). These
allowances, which ﬁrst emerged in the early 1980s, are often explained by
the fact that retailers are powerful gatekeepers. They are gatekeepers be-
cause they know that many products are new and that many of them fail,
and they are powerful because, as large multi-product retailers, they often
have little to lose by not selling a particular variety. Importantly, slotting
allowances are not used by all retailers in a given segment of the market and
they can vary a lot across products.5 This suggests that they are less the re-
sult of retailer characteristics than of the retailer-manufacturer relationship.
Our general equilibrium model sheds light on the circumstances under which
slotting allowances arise in equilibrium and on the factors determining their
size.6
Fourth, retailers play an important role in international trade, not only
because they carry many imported goods but also because they directly inter-
mediate a lot of trade. Bernard and al. (2010) document the international
trade activities of US retailers and wholesalers and ﬁnd that 13% of im-
3In 2002, the sales of supermarkets represented 77% of all US grocery sales for a to-
tal sale value of $547.1 billion and they collectively employed 3.2 million workers; see
www.fmi.org.
4In 2002, the number of supermarkets was 32,981 selling on average 35,000 items and
had an average size of 44,000 square feet; see FTC (2003).
5FTC (2003) reports, for instance, that slotting allowances are higher and more preva-
lent for products like ice cream and salad dressings than they are for bread and hot dogs.
6Note that slotting allowances should not be associated with high market concentration.
Although concentration in retailing has been rising, often faster than at the manufacturing
level (see Raﬀ and Schmitt, 2010), it is important to keep market concentration in retailing
separate from the use of slotting allowances and from the concept of ‘powerful’ retailers.
2porting ﬁrms are pure retailers responsible for a small proportion of overall
US import value but 35% of the value of imports from China. Basker and
Van (2008) ﬁnd that over the period 1997 to 2002 US imports from China
and other less-developed countries rose especially quickly in retail sectors
and that Wal-Mart alone accounts for around 15% of total US imports from
China (Basker and Van, 2010). This phenomenon is not limited to the United
States and has taken place in many industries, including electronics, com-
puters, cameras, housewares, toys, games, clothing, footwear and groceries.7
Blum and al. (2009, 2010) ﬁnd that considerable size diﬀerence exists be-
tween foreign exporters and the importers they deal with. In particular, they
ﬁnd that large multi-product retailers facilitate trade for small exporters be-
cause they provide an eﬃcient way of reaching consumers who otherwise
would be diﬃcult to ﬁnd.
In this paper we build a general equilibrium model with monopolistic com-
petition among retailers and among manufacturers to examine these stylized
facts and to explore the consequences for social welfare. The model has three
main components. The ﬁrst is a standard Krugman (1980) monopolistic-
competition manufacturing sector. Each manufacturer produces a single
variety of a consumer good with an increasing-returns-to-scale technology.
Of course, this is a simpliﬁcation as manufacturers are often multi-product
ﬁrms; however they typically produce a much smaller number of varieties (see
Eckel et al., 2009, for Mexico) than sold by retailers. The second component
is the retailing sector through which all diﬀerentiated products are distrib-
uted. Retailers choose their product assortment and retail prices. These
two choices give them power although limited by monopolistic competition.
Moreover, each of them understands that distributing more varieties within
its own store leads to a cannibalization eﬀect in the sense that the demand
for a new product ‘eats up’ some of the demand for the other varieties sold
in the store. We model this cannibalization eﬀect as in Feenstra and Ma
(2008), who have developed this idea for multi-product manufacturers.8
The third component is the critical link between the manufacturers and
the retailers, namely the wholesale market. We assume that retailers negoti-
ate wholesale prices with individual manufacturers. Even if this bargaining
7For instance, in 2003, the share of imports in Canada was 55% for clothing, 82% for
clothing accessories, 86% for footwear, 100% for audio, video, small electrical appliances,
as well as for toys and games (Jacobson, 2006, Table 33).
8See Dhingra (2010) for an alternative model of cannibalization and for showing that
intra-ﬁrm cannibalization is empirically relevant at the manufacturing level.
3is eﬃcient in the sense that the wholesale price maximizes the surplus of
each retailer-manufacturer pair, the wholesale price nevertheless exceeds the
marginal cost of production and thus creates an ineﬃciency in the vertical
distribution chain. This is because the retailer-manufacturer pair takes into
account the cannibalization eﬀect that selling the respective variety generates
for the retailer. The rent generated by this wholesale margin is dissipated in
equilibrium through slotting allowances.
Next we consider the comparative static properties of the model, con-
centrating on the eﬀects of market integration and technological change in
retailing. The model allows us to distinguish between two diﬀerent types of
integration. One is product-market integration, i.e., allowing manufacturers
to export their products to more countries and allowing retailers to source
diﬀerentiated products from diﬀerent countries. The other is retail-market
integration, i.e., allowing retail services to be tradable so that retailers have
access to consumers at home and abroad. We ﬁnd that the shift in employ-
ment from manufacturing to retailing, the rise in retailer product assortment
and the increase in slotting allowances are consistent with product-market
integration, but that the increase in retail market concentration is better ex-
plained by technological change in retailing. We also show that retail-market
integration yields greater gains than product-market integration, since it not
only leads to lower average production costs and greater product variety, but
also reduces the ineﬃciency in the vertical distribution chain.
Our paper is linked to several strands of the literature. There is a large
literature that examines the causes and consequences of slotting allowances.
A seminal contribution is Shaﬀer (1991) who shows that these allowances
may be used by retailers to soften price competition and shift rents from
manufacturers to retailers. Others, such as Sullivan (1992) and Klein and
Wright (2006), view slotting allowances as a price for scarce shelf space.
Our paper is also related to the growing literature on the role of interme-
diaries in international trade and their welfare impact. It includes Akerman
(2010), Antras and Costinot (2011), Blum et al. (2009), and Bardhan et al.
(2009).
Papers speciﬁcally examining the interaction between trade and retailing
include Richardson (2004) who studies market access to retail distribution,
Raﬀ and Schmitt (2005, 2006, 2009) who examine the eﬀects of trade liber-
alization on markets where either manufacturers or retailers have power over
the other group of ﬁrms, and Francois and Wooton (2010) who show that
market structure in distribution becomes increasingly important for trade as
4tariﬀs fall. They also include Basker and Van (2008) who investigate the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on competition between a chain retailer and
small single-market retailers, concluding that trade liberalization raises the
size of the chain retailer, and that the growth of the chain gives an additional
boost to imports.
Finally, papers using a monopolistic competition approach with retailers
include Eckel (2009) who develops a general equilibrium model to examine
the eﬀects of trade on retail market structure, especially on product variety
and accessibility of retailers, and Raﬀ and Schmitt (2011) who examine the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, retail mark-ups and
the pass-through of import into consumer prices when retail market structure
is endogenous and retailers are heterogenous.
The value-added of our paper is to provide a theoretical framework rooted
in the monopolistic-competition tradition to shed light on the stylized facts
discussed above and on the welfare consequences of product- and retail-
market integration.
The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple general
equilibrium model with manufacturers and retailers. Section 3 characterizes
the equilibrium of the closed economy, and Section 4 examines the eﬀects
of product market integration and technological change in retailing. Sec-
tion 5 deals with retail market integration and the associated welfare eﬀects.
Section 6 concludes, and the Appendix contains proofs.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a simple general equilibrium model of manufac-
turing and retailing. Consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over diﬀeren-
tiated goods that are produced by manufacturers and distributed by multi-
product retailers. Of particular interest is the wholesale market, in which
manufacturers and retailers interact. Prices in that market are determined
through bargaining. We ﬁrst develop a model of a closed economy and then
turn to a world economy consisting of identical countries with integrated
product and/or retail markets.
52.1 Households
The economy has L consumers/workers, each endowed with one unit of labor.
Individual preferences are given by the utility function
U = y0 + ρln(Yd), ρ < 1, (1)
where y0 denotes the consumption of an outside good, taken as the numeraire,
and Yd is the aggregate individual consumption of a diﬀerentiated product.
Letting yd(i) denote the quantity consumed of variety i, we assume that Yd










where η > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and   is the
endogenous set of varieties.
Labor, the only factor of production, is inelastically supplied and perfectly
mobile between the production and the retailing sectors. The numeraire
good, y0, is produced by a competitive industry under constant returns to
scale and a unit labor requirement of one. The price of labor is hence also
equal to one. Maximizing utility subject to the consumer’s budget constraint
and aggregating individual demands over the L consumers yields the follow-





where p(i) is the retail price of variety i, and P is the CES price index.
2.2 Firms
There are two kinds of ﬁrms, manufacturers and retailers. Firms are identical
within each of these two groups. We also assume that retailers are large
relative to manufacturers in the sense that each manufacturer produces a
single variety and sells that variety exclusively through one retailer, whereas
retailers carry many varieties.9 Each retailer decides what mass of varieties
to carry and sets the retail price of each variety. Since, in addition, the
9Exclusive dealing is common in many industries. Even in grocery retailing, there is
very little overlap between the products sold by diﬀerent stores when one considers barcode
6number or retailers is endogenously determined by free entry, the total mass
of varieties is also endogenous.
Our modelling of retailers as multi-product ﬁrms follows Feenstra and
Ma (2008) who develop this approach to study producers. There are R
retailers and the mass of varieties handled by retailer r is Mr > 0. Given
our assumption of exclusive dealing, each retailer carries a diﬀerent set of
varieties. Without loss of generality we choose the ordering of the products
such that retailer 1 carries the ﬁrst M1 varieties, retailer 2 the following M2
varieties, and so on. Hence the total mass of varieties consumed is   M ≡  R
r=1 Mr, and the aggregate consumption of varieties is
Yd =
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Similarly, the CES price index is given by
P =
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The assumption that a retailer carries a whole mass of varieties implies
that any adjustment he makes to his assortment or to prices across his assort-
ment has an eﬀect on the price index. It is both realistic and useful to assume
that retailers take this into account when choosing their assortment and set-
ting prices. Consider ﬁrst the implications for the retailer’s pricing decision.
Note that manufacturers in our model are symmetric so that a retailer faces
identical wholesale prices across all the varieties he sells. The retailer thus
sets the same retail price for all varieties in his assortment and responds to
a change in these wholesale prices by adjusting his retail prices across the
board. Denoting the price retailer r charges for each of the varieties he sells
data. Broda and Romalis (2009) ﬁnd that only around 2% of the 61,119 food Universal
Product Code categories sold by either Wal-Mart or Wholefoods are sold by both.
The choice between exclusive and non-exclusive dealing contracts has been studied in
a trade context by Raﬀ and Schmitt (2006, 2009). We have nothing new to add to the
analysis of this choice and therefore do not model it here. However, we explain below why
the restriction to exclusive contracts does not change the nature of our results.











Taking into account that the price index P is increasing in pr for Mr > 0
means that demand for each variety reacts less to price changes than in the
usual CES framework. More precisely, the price elasticity of demand is not



















Next consider how a multi-product retailer’s eﬀect on the price index
aﬀects the assortment choice. From (6) we see that an increase in Mr reduces
P. Using this in (3), we observe that demand for each variety falls. In other
words, the retailer acknowledges that adding a product to his assortment
lowers the demand for the other products he carries. As we will see below,
this ‘cannibalization’ eﬀect becomes bigger as the retailer adds products, thus
putting a limit on his product assortment.
Retailers are homogeneous in that they all use the same technology; we
may therefore drop retailer subscripts whenever this can be done without
causing confusion. Retailing involves a ﬁxed cost, k0, as well as a cost per
variety carried, k1. The former includes the usual headquarter costs such as
payments for information technology that plays a crucial role in retailing.
An example of the latter is the cost of shelf space. These costs turn out to
be important for the analysis. The marginal cost of selling a unit of a given
variety however does not play a crucial role and we normalize it to zero.
Hence the labor requirement of a retailer carrying a mass of M varieties is
given by
l
r = k0 + k1M. (9)
Manufacturers are single-product ﬁrms and enter the industry as long as
proﬁts are positive. We follow Krugman (1980) in assuming that their tech-
nology exhibits increasing returns to scale; speciﬁcally, production requires
a ﬁxed labor input, α, and a variable labor input, β, both identical across
8ﬁrms. Hence the total labor input required to produce y units of a given
variety is given by
l
m = α + βy, α,β > 0. (10)
2.3 The Wholesale Market
The manufacturing and the retailing side of the economy are linked through
the wholesale market. Contracts between manufacturers and retailers take
the form of two-part tariﬀs, consisting of a wholesale price, w, and a pay-
ment or transfer, T, from a manufacturer to a retailer (where T can be
negative). The reason for considering two-part tariﬀs is that we want to
examine whether the market equilibrium exhibits slotting allowances, which
we deﬁne as positive payments from manufacturers to retailers.
In equilibrium the two-part tariﬀs are determined by two forces, namely
by bargaining between retailers and manufacturers over the wholesale price,
and by free entry into manufacturing, which assures that the transfers be-
tween retailers and manufacturers are consistent with zero proﬁts. We do
not put much structure on the bargaining process, except to assume that (i)
each retailer bargains simultaneously and bilaterally with each manufacturer
whose product he intends to carry, and that (ii) bargaining is eﬃcient in the
sense that the wholesale price is chosen so as to maximize the joint surplus
of each retailer-manufacturer pair.
The reasoning behind (i) is simply that it would be diﬃcult, even illegal,
for a retailer to get together with all his suppliers to jointly ﬁx wholesale
prices.10 The reason for (ii) is that we do not want to introduce any market
failures, speciﬁcally double marginalization, through an ineﬃcient bargaining
procedure. Rather, we want to put the focus on market outcomes that arise
naturally when a multi-product retailer chooses his assortment but negotiates
the wholesale price individually with each manufacturer.
10The assumption of simultaneous bilateral bargaining between multi-product retailers
and individual manufacturers (or of manufacturers dealing with more than one retailer) is
standard in the industrial organization literature on buyer power (see Raﬀ and Schmitt,
2009).
93 Equilibrium of the Closed Economy
In this section we characterize the equilibrium of the closed economy. For





r = M (p − w)y − M (k1 − T) − k0. (11)
Substituting for y from (3), the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition with re-





(η − 1)(1 − s)
 
w. (12)
We observe that the higher is a retailer’s market share, s, the higher is his
mark-up. To derive the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to M, recall that
we have to take into account that y is a function of M through the eﬀect
each retailer has on the price index. The ﬁrst-order condition then reads:
(p − w)y − s(p − w)y = k1 − T. (13)
The left-hand side of (13) gives the marginal beneﬁt of adding a variety. It
has two elements: the ﬁrst term is the additional operating proﬁt generated
by this variety. The second term represents the cannibalization eﬀect, that
is, the reduction in the demand for the other varieties sold by the retailer
times the mark-up on these other varieties. The higher the retailer’s market
share, the bigger is this cannibalization eﬀect. On the right-hand side of (13)
we have the marginal cost of adding a variety, which consists of the direct
cost, k1, minus any transfer received from the manufacturer producing the
additional variety.
A manufacturer’s proﬁt, Πm, is given by
Π
m = (w − β)y − T − α. (14)
The surplus that is generated when a retailer adds the manufacturer’s prod-
uct to his assortment is equal to the sum of Πm and the incremental proﬁt
of the retailer, which we have already encountered in (13):
(w − β)y + (1 − s)(p − w)y − k1 − α. (15)
10Substituting for (p − w) from (12), the wholesale price maximizing this sur-














where dy/dp follows from (7) and dp/dw from (12). Solving (16) for the
equilibrium wholesale price yields:




The wholesale price thus exceeds the manufacturer’s marginal cost by a mar-
gin that is increasing in the retailer’s market share, s. This distortion is
due to the cannibalization eﬀect: the retailer/manufacturer pair takes into
account that additional sales of one variety reduce demand for other vari-
eties sold by the retailer. This eﬀect is stronger the greater the retailer’s
market share which implies that the wholesale price has to be increasing in
the market share.11
In equilibrium free entry by manufacturers implies that Πm = 0. As can
be seen from (14), the transfer from the manufacturer to the retailer hence
equals the quasi-rents earned by the manufacturer, (w−β)y, net of the ﬁxed
cost of production, α:
T = (w − β)y − α. (18)
This transfer, if it is positive, has a natural interpretation in the context of
our model, namely as a slotting allowance. Slotting allowances thus arise
precisely because the wholesale price exceeds the marginal production cost
so that manufacturers earn a quasi-rent. Naturally, if a manufacturer did
not earn any quasi-rent, he would be unable to pay a retailer for adding his
products to the assortment.12
11The surplus in (15) corresponds exactly to the proﬁt a manufacturer could obtain if
he were able to set T so as to extract the retailer’s proﬁt from adding his product to
the assortment. Obviously then the wholesale price in (17) is identical to the one the
manufacturer would choose if he had all the bargaining power.
12The cannibalization eﬀect is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition for the distortion
in the wholesale price and the associated slotting allowance. Shaﬀer (1991) shows that in
a setting, in which each good is distributed by more than one retailer, slotting allowances
with wholesale prices exceeding marginal cost may arise for strategic reasons: they can
serve as commitment devices to soften price competition between retailers. In this sense,
wholesale price distortions and slotting allowances do not depend on any special features
of our model and certainly not on the assumption of exclusive dealing.
11Using (17) and (18) in (13), we can solve for the output of each variety
y = (1 − s)
(k1 + α)(η − 1)
β
. (19)
This output is decreasing in s due to the fact that the wholesale price is
increasing in s as explained above.
To close the model we impose zero-proﬁt conditions on retailers and a
labor-market clearing condition on the diﬀerentiated goods sector. The re-
tailer zero-proﬁt condition is obtained by setting the proﬁt in (11) equal
to zero. This yields an expression for the mass of varieties carried by each




(R − 1). (20)
A second equation linking M and R is the labor-market clearing condi-
tion. Since in equilibrium a fraction ρ of the labor force is employed in
the diﬀerentiated-good industry (i.e., manufacturing and retailing), this con-
dition can be written as:
Rk0 + RM (k1 + α) + RMyβ = ρL. (21)




















η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s
 
k0(1 − ˆ s)
(k1 + α) ˆ s
, (23)
where ˆ s = 1/ ˆ R.
Using (12) and (17) we observe that the equilibrium retail price exceeds










η(1 − ˆ s)
 
β. (24)
12The equilibrium value of output per variety can be obtained by using ˆ s in
(19):
ˆ y = (1 − ˆ s)
(k1 + α)(η − 1)
β
, (25)
and the equilibrium transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer is
ˆ T = ˆ s
(η − 1)
η
(k1 + α) − α. (26)
If ˆ T is positive, we observe a slotting allowance. A slotting allowance has the
following properties:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium slotting allowance is increasing in the re-
tailer ﬁxed cost (k0), the cost of adding a variety (k1), the elasticity of sub-
stitution (η), and decreasing in the manufacturer’s ﬁxed cost (α) and the
fraction of income spent on diﬀerentiated goods (ρL).
Proof: see Appendix.
Clearly the higher is k1 and the greater is η, the less attractive it is for
a retailer to take on an additional variety. The slotting allowance hence has
to be higher to induce the retailer to do so. The same is true for a higher
k0 and a lower ρL which both reduce the number of retailers, thus making
them bigger and strengthening the cannibalization eﬀect.
The market equilibrium is ineﬃcient since it involves double marginal-
ization in the vertical distribution chain. Before moving on to examine the
positive and normative aspects of market integration it is useful to charac-
terize this ineﬃciency by comparing the market allocation to a second-best
allocation in which the double marginalization is ruled out by imposing a
wholesale price equal to the marginal production cost, i.e., wB = β, where
the superscript B denotes the second-best allocation. In this second best, the
transfer that guarantees manufacturers zero proﬁt is T B = −α. The second
best thus amounts to maximizing the sum of a retailer’s proﬁt and the proﬁts
of all the manufacturers he deals with.13
13One way to implement this second-best allocation is to give the retailers the power to
set w and T. This corresponds to the case of buyer power examined in a diﬀerent context
by Raﬀ and Schmitt (2009).
The opposite of buyer power is seller power, i.e. a situation in which the manufactur-
ers have all the bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀers to the retailers. As
already discussed, the allocation under seller power is identical to the one obtained in the
equilibrium of our model.
13Given these values of wB and TB, it is straightforward to establish that
RB = ˆ R and
M
B =
η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s
η
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β < ˆ p. (29)
Hence not only is the retail price in the market equilibrium too high compared
with the second best, but each retailer carries too many varieties and sells
too little of each variety. These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 In a closed economy, the product assortment of each retailer
is bigger and sales per variety are smaller than in the second best. The total
mass of diﬀerentiated products in the economy is larger than in the second
best.
This has implications for welfare and the allocation of resources between
manufacturing and retailing. It is immediate from (27) and (23) that in
equilibrium too much labor is devoted to distributing the mass of varieties
compared to the second best, ˆ R(k0 + k1 ˆ M) > ˆ R(k0 + k1MB). With a ﬁxed
amount of labor devoted to the diﬀerentiated good industry (ρL), this implies
that too little labor is left over for the production of each variety.
A similar reasoning applies to social welfare. Despite the fact that the
mass of varieties is bigger in equilibrium than in the second best, equilibrium
welfare turns out to be lower precisely because there is too little consumption
of each variety. We hence may state:
Proposition 3 In a closed economy, more labor is allocated to retailing and
social welfare is lower than in the second best.
Proof: see Appendix.
4 Product-Market Integration vs. Techno-
logical Change in Retailing
The question we want to investigate in this section is whether the model can
shed light on the stylized facts about retailing discussed in the introduction,
14namely the reallocation of labor from manufacturing to retailing, the rise
in slotting allowances, the growth of retailers’ assortment, and increased
market concentration in retailing. We focus on two plausible drivers of these
changes: product-market integration and technological change in retailing.
We consider the case of retail-market integration in the next section.
By product-market integration, we mean a scenario in which goods be-
come tradable across countries but retail services remain non-tradable. Man-
ufacturers are thus able to reach more consumers by exporting goods to for-
eign markets. From the point of view of retailers, however, the number of
households served does not change when product trade is liberalized, simply
because there is no cross-border shopping.
Technological change in retailing, speciﬁcally the adoption of information
and bar-code technology and more recently Radio Frequency Identiﬁcation,
has led to major improvements in inventory control, logistics and distribution
(Basker, 2007). These improvements have dramatically lowered the cost of
carrying additional varieties (k0), while boosting retailer ﬁxed costs (k1), and
raising the importance of economies of scale (Holmes, 2001).14
4.1 Product-Market Integration
We may examine the eﬀects of product-market integration by considering a
world consisting of identical countries indexed by c = 1,...,C and studying
how free trade in goods between them aﬀects the equilibrium. From the point
of view of a manufacturer, free trade means that his market has expanded as
he is now able to sell his products to C retailers, one each in the C countries
comprising the integrated world economy. Another way of saying this is that
the manufacturer is able to spread his ﬁxed cost over C markets. In eﬀect,
the ﬁxed cost of manufacturing per country becomes α/C.
Since product-market integration only amounts to a reduction of the ﬁxed
cost of production per market, it neither aﬀects the determination of the
wholesale and retail prices, nor does it change the number of retailers. What
changes is output and the number of varieties. To show this formally, we
have to make a few straightforward modiﬁcations to our notation. Let the
assortment that each retailer carries now be given by M = CMc, where Mc
is the number of varieties produced in country c. Let yc denote the quantity
14See also Basker (2011) for empirical evidence on the eﬀect of bar-code technology on
retail productivity and the signﬁcant set-up costs associated with its adoption.
15sold in country c and Tc denote the transfer received by a retailer in that
country.
With this notation, we can examine how the labor market equilibrium in
a given country is aﬀected by free trade. In particular, only a mass RMc of
varieties sold by retailers in a given country are locally produced varieties,
but each local producer now has an output equal to Cyc. Hence RMycβ units
of labor are needed to cover the variable labor requirement in production.
The ﬁxed labor requirement in production absorbs RMcα = RMα/C units
of labor, and the remaining labor is allocated to retailing. The new labor







+ RMycβ = ρL. (30)
Noting that the number of retailers in each country and hence retailer
market share remains unchanged at ˆ s, we can compute the mass of varieties
(local and imported) carried by a retailer and local consumption of each




η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s
 
k0(1 − ˆ s)
(k1 + α/C) ˆ s
, (31)
˜ yc = (1 − ˆ s)
(k1 + α/C)(η − 1)
β
. (32)
Product-market integration thus leads to a market equilibrium in which there
is a larger mass of product varieties carried by each retailer (d ˜ M/dC > 0),
a larger total mass of varieties available to consumers (since the number
of retailers remains unaﬀected), and a decrease in the consumption of each
variety (d˜ yc/dC < 0).
While these eﬀects are not entirely surprising,15 a novel result is the im-
pact of product-market integration on the allocation of labor between man-
ufacturing and retailing. Since resources are being saved in manufacturing,
product-market integration implies a shift in resources from manufacturing
into the retail sector. This can be seen from (30) where the amount of labor
allocated to retailing ( ˆ R ˜ Mk1) rises, the ﬁxed labor requirement in manufac-
turing ( ˆ R ˜ Mα/C) declines, while the variable labor input in manufacturing
15The change in consumption is non-standard in a model with CES preferences, but is
due to the fact that in our model the price elasticity of demand is not constant.
16( ˆ R ˜ M˜ ycβ) remains unchanged. What makes this reallocation of labor possible
is the fact that while the mass of varieties available to consumers rises with
market integration, the mass of varieties produced in each country falls so
that less labor is required in manufacturing.
By replacing α with α/C in (26), we can compute the slotting allowance
that a manufacturer has to pay each of the C retailers carrying his product:
˜ Tc = ˆ s
(η − 1)
η
(k1 + α/C) − α/C. (33)
Product-market integration obviously erodes the quasi-rent earned by the
manufacturer, the ﬁrst term in (33). But the ﬁxed cost falls by even more so
that, on balance, the slotting allowance paid by a manufacturer to each re-
tailer rises as C goes up. In addition, even if there were no slotting allowance
in autarky (ˆ T ≤ 0 in (26)), it has to be the case that in free trade ˜ Tc > 0 if
C is suﬃciently big. We may therefore state:
Proposition 4 Product-market integration (i) has no eﬀect on the number
of retailers and total retail sales; (ii) raises the product assortment carried
by each retailer and the total mass of varieties available to consumers; (iii)
reduces the quantity consumed of each variety; (iv) raises slotting allowances;
and (v) leads to a reallocation of labor from manufacturing to retailing.
These results are consistent with three stylized facts listed in the intro-
duction, namely the shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing, the
rise in slotting allowances, and the increase in retailer product assortment.
However, in our model product-market integration leaves retail market con-
centration unchanged. This suggests that other changes may be driving this
stylized fact. A likely candidate is technological change in retailing.
4.2 Technological Change in Retailing
As argued above, technological change in retailing has signiﬁcantly reduced
k1 and raised k0. The eﬀects of a fall in k1 are straightforward, since there is
no change in the number of retailers or in retail and wholesale prices. As can
be immediately seen from (23), (25) and (26), the mass of varieties carried
by each retailer rises, the output per variety and slotting allowances fall.
Turning to k0, we observe from (22) that an increase in k0 reduces the
equilibrium number of retailers (d ˆ R/dk0 < 0), which directly implies greater
17retail market concentration. A greater retailer market share leads to higher
retail and wholesale prices, greater slotting allowances, and lower output per
variety. The eﬀect on the retailer product assortment, however, is non-trivial,
since k0 aﬀects the equilibrium assortment directly and indirectly through the
eﬀect on the number of retailers. The direct eﬀect is positive: an increase in
k0 requires retailers to carry a larger product assortment in order to avoid
making losses. The indirect eﬀect is associated with the cannibalization
eﬀect and has a negative sign: an increase in market share implied by a rise
in k0 raises the cost of expanding the assortment, because adding a variety
reduces demand for the other varieties carried by the retailer. However, we
prove in the Appendix that the direct eﬀect outweighs the indirect eﬀect so
that d ˆ M/dk0 > 0.
The combined eﬀect of a fall in k1 and a rise in k0 can then be summarized
as follows:
Proposition 5 A decrease in the retail cost per variety combined with an in-
crease in the ﬁxed cost of retailing (i) raises retail market concentration; (ii)
increases the mass of varieties carried by each retailer; (iii) lowers consump-
tion of each variety; and (iv) has an ambiguous eﬀect on slotting allowances.
Proof: see Appendix.
In other words, to reproduce in our model the main stylized facts listed
in the introduction we require not just product-market integration but also
technological change in retailing, especially if one wants to generate retailers
with higher market shares.
5 Retail-Market Integration and Welfare
An important point of this paper is to demonstrate that there is a fundamen-
tal distortion in the relationship between independent multi-product retailers
and manufacturers. Product-market integration, while raising social welfare
due to gains from variety, leaves this distortion unchanged. In particular,
even with product-market integration, product variety is too large, output
per variety too small and too much labor is allocated to retailing compared
with the second best.
In this section, we show that this distortion could be reduced through
retail-market integration. In particular, we prove:
18Proposition 6 Retail-market integration (i) moves the equilibrium alloca-
tion closer to the second best; and (ii) raises social welfare by more than
product-market integration alone.
Proof: see Appendix.
Retail-market integration means that retailers gain access to foreign cus-
tomers. In our model this implies not just free trade in retail services, but
rather full market integration. In fact, having an integrated retail market
simply means that domestic products are exported by retailers instead of
manufacturers.
Fully integrating both retail and product markets allows both manufac-
turers and retailers to spread their ﬁxed costs, including the cost of carrying a
variety, across markets and thus to realize economies of scale. This is equiva-
lent to an increase in market size, L, which, according to (22), raises the total
number of retailers and thus lowers the market share of each retailer, ˆ s. A
lower retail market share reduces the distortion in the wholesale price, mov-
ing it closer to marginal cost β, as can be seen from (17). A lower wholesale
mark-up is equivalent to a smaller slotting allowance. Another way to see
this is to note that a smaller ˆ s reduces the cannibalization eﬀect and hence
the payment manufacturers have to oﬀer retailers to obtain distribution for
their products. The retail price declines due to the reduced wholesale price
and because a retailer with a lower market share perceives a higher price
elasticity of demand and thus charges a smaller retail mark-up. Output of
each variety obviously has to increase when retail prices fall.
To understand the eﬀect of retail-market integration on retailer product








where the ﬁrst term comes from the market distortion. The reduction in the
cannibalization eﬀect associated with a smaller ˆ s increases directly MB. How-
ever, the distortion also becomes smaller which decreases the ﬁrst term. As
shown in the Appendix, the eﬀect on MB dominates so that retailer product
assortment rises. Social welfare must unambiguously rise, since retail prices
fall and overall product variety in the economy increases. Finally, as the
distortion in the wholesale market shrinks, equilibrium welfare approaches
the second-best level.
196 Conclusions
Signiﬁcant changes have occurred in retailing over the last forty years. To un-
derstand better some of the forces that might drive these changes, this paper
proposes a simple general equilibrium model that not only includes retailing
but also the relationship between retailers and manufacturers through the
wholesale market. Cast in a monopolistic-competition framework with multi-
product retailers, the model allows us to consider several possible shocks that
might contribute to explain why some key stylized facts are observed. One
is market integration which in the present approach may take two separate
forms, namely product-market and retail-service market integration. The
other is technological change especially at the retailing level.
We have argued that product-market integration goes a long way to ex-
plaining several important stylized facts regarding retailing and manufactur-
ing. Indeed it helps understand the shift in employment from manufacturing
to retailing, the more prevalent use of slotting allowances as well as the
larger product assortment carried by retailers. The only important stylized
fact that product-market integration fails to account for in our model is the
rise in market concentration in retailing. It requires adding technological
changes, such as the increased use of information and communication tech-
nology that raises the ﬁxed cost of retailing.
It is important to understand why some of these results occur. First,
we are able to generate slotting allowances because each multi-product re-
tailer understands that selling one more variety reduces the demand for the
other varieties he sells. This cannibalization eﬀect implies that when a re-
tailer enters into a competitive relationship with manufacturers and bargains
bilaterally with each manufacturer whose product he considers selling, the
bargaining pair agrees to a wholesale price in excess of the marginal cost
combined with a ﬁxed payment which, when it is paid by a manufacturer
to a retailer, represents a slotting allowance. This allowance and the ineﬃ-
ciency it is associated with are thus directly linked to the fact that retailers
are multi-product ﬁrms; they do not depend, however, on our simple model-
ing of manufacturers producing a single good. The same ineﬃciency would
persist with multi-product manufacturers as long as one manufacturer is not
the only provider of the products sold by a retailer and thus as long as each
manufacturer produces a smaller mass of varieties than sold by a retailer.
Second, the fact that, in the present model, product-market integration
shifts employment from manufacturing to retailing comes from a standard
20general-equilibrium eﬀect. The integration of product markets allows man-
ufacturers to realize economies of scale by selling to more customers, and
the mass of manufacturers in each country falls. For consumers, the drop
in the mass of domestic varieties is more than compensated by their access
to imported varieties. But since consumers buy the larger mass of varieties
from retailers, retailing must use more labor and this is possible precisely
because labor saved in manufacturing is reallocated to retailing. In the case
of product-market integration, the number of retailers remains the same and
thus retailing uses more labor only because retailers sell a larger assortment
of products. Incidentally, the fact that retail concentration does not change
with product-market integration is in part due to the structure of the model,
particularly the fact that retailers are identical. In a related paper that places
much more emphasis on the retailing sector and much less on the links with
manufacturers, Raﬀ and Schmitt (2011) show that product-market integra-
tion may indeed lead to higher concentration at the retail level when there is
heterogeneity among retailers. In the present paper with identical retailers,
the number of retailers does change too but with retail-market integration.
In this case, a similar general-equilibrium eﬀect occurs than in the case of
product-market integration, leading to an increase in retailers’ assortment
and a shift in employment from manufacturing to retailing. But the al-
location of labor is less skewed toward retailing than with product-market
integration because the number of retailers in each country falls.
Third, retail-market integration brings higher welfare gains than product-
market integration because retail-market integration results in an eﬃciency
gain in the vertical distribution chain. Indeed retail-market integration, but
not product-market integration, reduces the gap between the market equi-
librium wholesale price and the marginal cost of production. It is also the
presence of this same ineﬃciency that allows us to conclude that, with respect
to the second-best outcome, retailers sell too many products in too small a
quantity, at too high a price, and that too much resources are devoted to
retailing as compared to manufacturing.
In this paper, we have assumed that retailers and manufacturers are in-
dependent and that manufacturers must bargain with retailers in order to
have their product made available to consumers. Vertical integration could
easily be examined in our model as well. In fact, to the extent that vertical
integration eliminates the ineﬃciency between each retailer and the manu-
facturers it deals with, the market outcome would be identical to the second
best derived in Section 3. This shows one more time that a central point of
21this paper is linked to the ineﬃciency that manufacturers and multi-product
retailers generate when they must bargain.
More broadly, this paper suggests that, in order to understand economic
integration or the policies associated with it in today’s world, our attention
should not be restricted exclusively to freer trade in goods or services sepa-
rately. Indeed when services such as retailing are closely associated with the
products themselves because there is a complementarity between production,
sales and distribution, then not only may market integration take diﬀerent
forms but its impact may diﬀer as well depending on the speciﬁc form of the
integration. It is then crucial to understand in detail how the production
and distribution of goods interact. This is what this paper has started to do
in light of the facts that have unfolded over the last few decades.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Given (22) and (26), the changes in ˆ T caused by changes in k0, k1, α and ρL
are straightforward. To determine the comparative statics with respect to η
rewrite ˆ T as
ˆ T =















































































































7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Since consumers spend a ﬁxed share of their income on diﬀerentiated goods,
indirect utility is strictly decreasing in the price index for diﬀerentiated goods.
The price indices in equilibrium and in the second best are given respectively
by ˆ P = ˆ p
 
ˆ R ˆ M
  1
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. Given that the number of
retailers is the same in equilibrium and in the second best, the respective
price indices can be written as
ˆ P = ˆ p
 













ˆ P − P





















(1 − ˆ s)
 
η






ˆ P − P B > 0 provided that the expression in brackets is positive. This is the
case if
f(ˆ s,η) ≡ ˆ s − η (1 − ˆ s)
 





for η > 1 and ˆ s ∈ (0,1). Note that f(0,η) = 0. The proof proceeds by
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Using (23) and (27) after applying ˆ s = 1/ ˆ R, we can decompose the eﬀect on














































Hence dMB/dk0 > 0 if and only if
 












Rewriting the labor-market clearing condition as
η   R




and using (44) in (43) we obtain R2 − 2R + 1 > 1/η, which holds as both R
and η are greater than one.
247.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Given an increase in L, the increase in ˆ R (and decrease in ˆ s) follows imme-
diately from (22). The decrease in ˆ s reduces ˆ p and ˆ w, as can be seen in (24)




k0(1 − ˆ s)
(k1 + α) ˆ s
η(η − 1)
(η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s)
2 −
k0
(k1 + α) ˆ s2
η
η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s
= −
k0
(k1 + α) ˆ s2
η
(η(1 − ˆ s) + ˆ s)
2 [(1 − s)(η(1 − s) + s) + s] < 0.
Overall product variety, ˆ R ˆ M, rises, since both components increase.
The rise in social welfare follows directly from the fall in the price in-
dex due to the decrease in retail prices and the increase in ˆ R ˆ M. To see
why equilibrium welfare approaches the second best, note from the proof of
Proposition 3 that
 
ˆ P − P B
 
is proportional to f(ˆ s,η), as deﬁned in (38);
but f(ˆ s,η) approaches zero as ˆ s falls.
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